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EQUAL MARRIAGE RIGHTS
FOR TRANSGENDERED INDIVIDUALS

T

By Parker Thoeni*

he prevailing view on marriage is premised on a binary
conceptualization of the sexual characteristics of the
two adults involved. This approach is typified by the
Defense of Marriage Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1996,
which limits marriage to the legal union of one man and one
woman for the purposes of federal law.1 Considering the
medical facts about this topic, however, it becomes apparent that
there are a plethora of scenarios where two consenting adults
who wish to be married do not fit into the categorically binary
definition of marriage between a man and a woman.2 Just as in
the 2004 case Deane v. Conaway, where nine same-sex couples
and a man whose partner had recently passed away unsuccessfully challenged a Maryland law which denied same-sex
couples the right to marry,3 transsexual or transgendered
individuals could take issue with being precluded from marriage
on the basis of sex. The scarcity of these challenges most likely
stems from the unfortunate consequences of a history of social
and official discrimination and isolation severe enough to keep
citizens from coming out of the woodwork.4 This article analyzes
the Maryland Family Law’s restriction on the marriage rights of
transgendered individuals.

between these factors for transgendered individuals and others.8
The relationship between sex and gender is thus not always a
binary concept limited to all male or all female.9 Neither are the
terms “sex” and “gender” always synonymous; “sex” refers to
one’s anatomy and biological function in reproduction whereas
“‘gender’ refers to psychosexual individuality or identity.”10

NON-CONGRUENT SEX CHARACTERISTICS

The initial development of a fetus is asexual, followed by
the formation of rudimentary sexual organs based on the presence or absence of a Y chromosome.11 When the sexual development of the fetus is changed or interrupted, people are born
with sexual features that are either ambiguous (inconsistent with
either “male” or “female” characteristics) or incongruent
(inconsistent with their assigned sex).12 Doctors in the past commonly believed that a person was psychosexually neutral at birth
and that the development after birth was dependent on the appearance of the person’s genitals.13 The medical community no
longer accepts this view, and many researchers believe that a
person’s brain differentiates in utero to one gender or the other.14
This offers a “biological explanation for transsexualism the brain
has differentiated to one sex while the body has differentiated to
SEX AND GENDER
another.”15
For the purposes of this article, the term “transgender”
At ages as young as three or four years old, many
means having personal
transsexual individuals may
characteristics that tranbegin to believe they have
scend traditional gender
grown up with the wrong
Regardless of the nature of an individual’s
boundaries and correspondgenitalia and proceed to
inconsistent or ambiguous sex characteristics,
ing sexual norms.5 The
rebel against the social ortraditional binary model of and regardless of the treatment they may undergo,
der imposed upon them,
a transgendered individual may one day wish to
sex and gender, emerging
refusing
to
wear
from the Middle Ages,
make a lifelong commitment to another
“appropriate” clothes or
shoehorns individuals into
participate in activities
consenting adult and enter into the union of
the categorical role of
associated with their genmarriage with that adult.
“male” or “female.” During
der.16 Even so, “the official
those early times, intersex
designation of a person as
individuals were forced to choose one of the two established male or female usually occurs at or immediately after birth, and
gender roles, with the penalties for transgression being as seri- is often based on the appearance of the external genitalia.”17
ous as death.6
Transgendered individuals who wish to bring their sex charMedical experts today recognize that many factors acteristics into alignment with either the male or female categocontribute to the determination of an individual’s sex, including ries have limited options. These include psychotherapy, living as
the presence of sexual organs, facial and chest hair or breasts, a person of the assigned sex, hormonal treatment, and sex reas“sexual identity (one’s own sense of one’s sexual identity), signment surgery.18 “Estimates of the number of intersexed indigender identity (the gender society would attribute to an viduals vary considerably, from 1 per 37,000 people to as high as
individual), and gender role (the extent to which one chooses to 1 per 2,000 people.”19
live in one’s self-identified sex).”7 While most individuals do
Regardless of the nature of an individual’s inconsistent or
not find any inconsistencies between these factors in their ambiguous sex characteristics, and regardless of the treatment
identification as a male or female, there is some ambiguity they may undergo, a transgendered individual may one day wish
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THE MODERN AMERICAN

to make a lifelong commitment to another consenting adult and
enter into the union of marriage with that adult. Although the
Maryland Family Law currently burdens, arguably to the point
of preclusion, transgendered individuals’ marriage rights, legal
discrimination based on sex is forbidden by Maryland’s state
constitution.20

FAMILY LAW AND EQUAL RIGHTS IN MARYLAND

however, mandates that transgendered individuals be granted the
right to marry a consenting individual of their choice because
classifications based on sex are considered suspect and thus
subject to strict scrutiny, and because § 2-201 is a sex-based
classification on its face. Section 2-201 is a sex-based
classification on its face because it grants different rights to men
and women, and it burdens the marriage rights of transgendered
individuals. In addition, laws precluding transgendered
individuals from marrying a consenting adult are not narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Just as a
statute that benefits males at the expense of everyone else
violates the ERA, a statute that benefits males and females at the
expense of everyone else violates the ERA.
The government may make a gender-based classification
only when it can show that the classification is narrowly tailored
to achieve compelling state goals.34 Whenever a law refers to an
individual’s gender on its face, the state must have a compelling
reason for doing so; the theory of “equal application” has been
rejected in Maryland.35 Application of the strict scrutiny standard of review inevitably leads to the conclusion that transgendered individuals are eligible to enjoy the same benefits of marriage as all other individuals in Maryland.

While states have approached marriage issues in a variety of
ways, from banning same-sex marriages by constitutional
amendment to finding prohibitions on same-sex marriage to
violate a number of constitutional provisions, the best analysis
of transgender marriage rights in Maryland rests on the
application of the state’s Equal Rights Amendment (hereinafter
“ERA”). By avoiding the issue of fundamental due process
rights to marriage and privacy,21 and by avoiding application of
the rational basis standard of review, courts in Maryland leave
the decision to usurp the ERA to the people through a
constitutional amendment. Such actions have failed to pass
through the legislative branch.22
The ERA, passed by the legislature and ratified by voters in
1972, became Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
and states that “[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be
REJECTION OF THE “EQUAL APPLICATION” THEORY
abridged or denied because of sex.”23 The historical denial of
Even though both men and women have the right to marry
equal rights for women preceding the ERA reveals the basic
principle of the ERA; sex is not a permissible factor in determin- someone of the opposite sex, § 2-201 is a sex-based classification because Maryland has reing legal rights.24 The ERA
jected the “equal application”
recognized that preserving the
Application of the strict scrutiny standard
theory as unpersuasive. Article
status quo could mean stigmaof
review
inevitably
leads
to
the
conclusion
24, the due process clause of
tizing a class of people based
that transgendered individuals are eligible the Maryland Declaration of
on mistaken reliance on
to enjoy the same benefits of marriage
Rights,36 does not contain an
internalized stereotypes rather
express equal protection clause,
than on medical facts.25 Maryas all other individuals in Maryland.
land’s ERA may have mistakbut Maryland courts have long
enly internalized the binary
recognized that the due process
26
notion that sex is limited to “male” and “female.” But without clause implicitly guarantees equal protection similar to the equal
a doubt, the concept of sex incorporates, if not turns on, gender protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal
identity.27
constitution in both manner and extent.37
Under the ERA, sex- and gender-based classifications are
Because it could not realistically be contended that the peo28
considered suspect, subject to strict scrutiny. The Maryland ple, in adding the ERA, intended to repeat what was already
Court of Appeals initially interpreted the language of Article 46 contained in Article 24, Maryland courts have interpreted Artias clear and unambiguous.29 Since that point, the court has cle 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights as developing one
stated, “because of [Article 46], classifications based on gender of those differences: “segregation based upon sex, absent subare suspect and subject to strict scrutiny.”30 While this standard stantial justification, violates the [ERA], just as segregation
“flatly prohibits gender-based classifications, absent substantial based upon race violates the Fourteenth Amendment.”38 The
justification,”31 the court has clarified that the ERA forbids the divergence here from the federal notion of equal protection is
determination of rights solely on the basis of one’s sex.32
the treatment of sex as a suspect class, not the manner in which
Maryland Family Law § 2-201, however, states that “[o]nly equal protection is applied to a suspect class.39 Thus, Marya marriage between a man and a woman is valid in this State.”33 land’s strict scrutiny standard likely incorporates federal stanTo the extent that § 2-201 is intended to benefit men and dards that rejected the “equal application” and “separate but
women, and in effect primarily benefits only men and women, it equal” theories with respect to suspect classes.40 Indeed, the
imposes some additional burden, inconvenience and expense to rejection of the “separate but equal” theory, limiting the term
transgendered individuals by forcing them to “pass” as a man or “marriage” to a relationship between a man and a woman, would
a woman in order to reap the benefits of marriage. The ERA, be a sex-based classification.
Special Summer-Fall 2007
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Even if Maryland accepted the theories of “equal preserving traditional societal values.48
Promoting a traditional family unit that encourages
application” and “separate but equal,” limiting the definition of
sex to the binary categories of “all
procreation is neither compelling nor
narrowly tailored because it is based
male” and “all female,” the resulting
scheme would inherently exclude
on the presumption that people who
As race is more than just black
do not fit into the traditional binary
people from marriage on the basis
or white, so is sex more than
sex system, even to the extent that
of sex. As race is more than just
just
male
or
female.
only their sexual orientation differs,
black or white, so is sex more than
are not similarly situated to those
just male or female. The “equal
application” argument that all indiwho do so with respect to raising a
41
viduals are free to marry someone of the “opposite sex,” is just child. However, the ERA does not allow the presumption that a
as faulty and non-sensical as an argument that all individuals are man or a woman is better suited to raise a child of a certain sex,
free to marry someone of the “opposite race.” To avoid a dis- so it likewise bars the presumption that a man or a woman is
criminatory
classification, the word “opposite” must be re- better suited to raise any child.49 Therefore, ERA also bars the
presumption that a male-female couple is better suited to raise a
placed with the word “any.”
By assuming that all people are either purely male or purely child than any other ouple, without respect to sex.
To the extent that procreation is argued to be natural, such
female, proponents of the equal application theory attempt to
force a square peg into a round hole. Just as a law defining mar- an argument is based on internalized stereotypes that fail to
riage as only between two white people would burden some recognize that individuals are born with sex characteristics that
white people (those wishing to marry someone non-white) and do not fit the binary mold.50 Regardless, §2-201 is not narrowly
all non-white people, a law defining marriage as only between a tailored to meet that goal because it does not claim to invalidate
man and a woman burdens some men and women, and all trans- marriages because the couple cannot or has not chosen to
gendered individuals who do not fit those categories. Thus, procreate.
Any argument that these conclusions are counter to societal
even if the equal application theory were accepted, it does not
values and tradition is misplaced. The traditional notion of
apply.
marriage is a thorn in the foot of Maryland’s overarching tradiA SUSPECT CLASS OF TRANSGENDERED INDIVIDUALS
tions of tolerance and protection of minorities. One instance in
Those who fall outside the male/female dichotomy and are which the state may permissibly grant benefits on the basis of
therefore left without marriage rights should be considered a sex arises where women seek remedies to past wrongs. Such
suspect class.42 Under Maryland equal protection, a “suspect remedies are similar to those allowed under the Fourteenth
51
The long
class is a category of people who have experienced a history of Amendment in instances of racial classifications.
purposeful unequal treatment or been subjected to unique denial of equal rights to women that prompted the ERA has
disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indeed applied to women’s marriage rights, and those inequities
indicative of their abilities.”43 The long history of purposeful
unequal treatment of transgendered people is unquestionable.44
Transgendered individuals are thus a suspect class, and the
Maryland’s marriage statute does not
Maryland Family Law should be reviewed under strict scrutiny
pass muster in limiting marriage rights
instead of rational basis review.45 Because § 2-201 makes a
to men and women because the means by
gender-based classification on its face, it must be narrowly
46
tailored to achieve compelling state interests.
which people are identified as men or
There are no compelling government interests furthered by
women are not made clear enough to be
narrowly tailored means when marriage is limited as between a
considered narrowly tailored.
man and a woman. Thus, the best way to define marriage is
between two individuals, rather than conditioning marriage
rights on any sexual characteristics.
52
Though the government in Deane failed to assert a have since been equalized. For example, there may very well
compelling interest in restricting marriage rights on the basis of be compelling government interests in providing women with a
53
sex, the true legislative intent of § 2-201 of prohibiting same-sex remedy for past discrimination from male sports. Of course, if
47
the classification included anyone other than women, and lasted
marriages can easily be derived from the face of the statute.
Any attempt to justify this government interest as compelling longer than necessary to remedy the past wrongs, it would not
should fail, and a marriage statute that defines marriage on the be narrowly tailored to the class of individuals discriminated.
basis of sex is not narrowly tailored to meet any government Even if the exclusion of homosexuals from marriage were a
interest that is valid under the ERA. In Deane, the government compelling interest, marriage, as defined between a man and a
asserted an interest in promoting traditional family units and woman, is not narrowly tailored because it is under-inclusive
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and over-inclusive. Maryland’s marriage statute does not pass pass muster under the ERA because the relevant characteristic
muster in limiting marriage rights to men and women because gender identity may be male, female, or neither, without respect
the means by which people are identified as men or women are to the physical characteristics of an individual. Reliance on the
not made clear enough to be considered narrowly tailored. original birth certificate, or the genitals an individual has at
While § 2-201 uses the words “man” and “woman,” it fails to birth, is not narrowly tailored because it focuses on mutable
offer a definition of either. Section 2-201 does not require any characteristics.58 Requiring a medical showing of sex change is
showing of sex. Section 2-402 of the Maryland Family Law not narrowly tailored because it burdens transgendered
requires details such as name, address, prior relationship, social individuals more than others on the basis of sex by requiring a
security number, and age, leaving it to the clerk to withhold showing based on genitals at birth; an individual’s gender does
licenses if he or she feels that there may be legal reasons why not change with medical procedures.59
If the government does not recognize a change in sex, then
applicants for a marriage license should not be married under
the Maryland Family Law.54 By granting marriage rights to it relies on the sex assigned at birth, which is most commonly
“men” and to “women” without offering a sufficient mechanism based solely on the appearance of the external genitalia. By
with which to define a “man” or a “woman,” § 2-201 at least failing to recognize a change in gender, the government
burdens, and potentially precludes, transgendered individuals implicitly allows an individual who, for example, was born with
from getting married because of their gender identity male sex characteristics that have since been changed to female
sex characteristics, to marry a woman. However, it does not
differences, and more specifically, because of sex.55
The Maryland Court of Appeals recently held that allow an individual who was born with female sex
individuals must be allowed to change their birth certificates to characteristics, which have since been changed to male sex
reflect their sex identity; however, it first required evidence of a characteristics, to marry a woman. Therefore, physical sex
“permanent and irreversible change” from male to female.56 characteristics are not relevant to marriage between a man and a
The court in In re Heilig required a showing based on medical woman to the extent that the genitals with which an individual is
facts, but carefully avoided concluding that surgery would be born define sex.
the only permissible medical fact.57 Requiring any showing of
If the government does recognize a change in sex, then it
sex, sex change or congruency between sex and gender allows a person born with male sex characteristics that have
characteristics as a condition to marriage, shows that any since been changed to female sex characteristics to marry a
mechanism by which an indiwoman upon a showing that
vidual’s sex is defined for the
such a change has in fact ocpurposes of marriage, is overcurred. However, that change
The Maryland Court of Appeals recently
broad.
must occur prior to the marheld
that
individuals
must
be
allowed
to
The court in In re Heilig
riage. A person born with male
change their birth certificates to reflect
found that a change in sex desex characteristics could marry a
noted on an individual’s birth their sex identity; however, it first required
woman, and after the marriage,
certificate was permissible, but evidence of a “permanent and irreversible
transition to female sex characit left open the question of what
teristics. Because the individchange” from male to female.
would need to be shown to esual’s sex is not changed except
tablish such a change and
upon a showing to a court, the
whether this change on the birth certificate would mean a marriage remains valid. If a showing is not required after marchange in sex for the purposes of marriage. The methods used riage, it cannot be required prior to marriage. Therefore,
to determine someone’s sex for the purposes of marriage are whether a change in sex is allowed or not, two individuals with
presently unclear, but presumably either the sex on a person’s the same sex characteristics may end up together in marriage if
birth certificate at birth, or as amended, or in a driver’s license, the government considers sex characteristics to be mutable and
would be determinative.
not locked at birth.
Therefore, the first question regarding the determination of
For the purposes of limiting marriage as between a man and
an individual’s sex for the purposes of marriage is whether a woman, an individual’s sex must be defined by gender idenindividuals are defined as a man or a woman based on the sex tity. However, the government does not require a showing that
denoted on their original birth certificates, or whether two individuals getting married have one partner who identifies
individuals may change their sex for the purpose of marriage. as a male and one who identifies as a female.60
Requiring congruency between a person’s sex and gender
The second question then is what criteria should be used if an
individual’s sex may be changed for the purposes of marriage. characteristics lacks narrow tailoring as well. The presence or
If the determination of sex does not hinge on sex as recorded at absence of surgery or hormonal treatment cannot be the basis
birth, the method of determination of sex cannot simply lead to upon which the decision is made, because not only is gender an
immutable characteristic, but furthermore the cost-prohibitive
the categories of male and female.
Marriage defined as between a man and a woman does not nature of surgery conditions marriage rights on the ability to pay
Special Summer-Fall 2007
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for a medical procedure. Indeed, requiring congruency is not a falling short of being compelling. If a showing has not been
narrowly tailored test because it is easily evaded by delaying required of course, Maryland has not concerned itself with two
any medical procedures.61 If consistency is to be required, then people of the same gender marrying one another. The benefits
everyone must bear the same burden of proof, and the of marriage may not fall solely on men and women, no matter
government must require from everyone a showing that their how they are defined, because sex is more complex than simply
gender identity is consistent with their physical sex “male” and “female.”
characteristics. This places the focus on the irreversible gender
PHYSICAL DIFFERENCE AS A LEGITIMATE BASIS ON
identity rather than the changeable physical sex characteristics.
WHICH TO MAKE SEX CLASSIFICATIONS
Requiring a showing of sex prior to marriage based on genitals
at birth is not narrowly tailored.
Maryland has recognized physical differences as legitimate
The government lacks a narrowly tailored definition of bases on which to make sex classifications.63 During isolated
marriage by defining it as between a man and a woman, even as personal interactions, physical sex characteristics are most
defined by gender identity alone,
noticeable in the context of onebecause it is inherently either
time contacts. Since marriage
Because defining a person’s sex focuses
under-inclusive or overinvolves every day contact with
on gender identity, and because
inclusive. Because defining a
a person, not just a one-time run
individuals can have ambiguous
person’s sex focuses on gender
in with the body of a person, and
gender identities, the scope of
identity, and because individuals
because the marriage contact is
can have ambiguous gender
marriage rights must be expanded to
consensual, gender identification
identities,62 the scope of marnot physical sex characteristics
include those people.
riage rights must be expanded to
are relevant. Physical sex charinclude those people. However, when marriage is recognized as acteristics may be relevant to the extent that those characteristics
between a man and a woman, it becomes clear that accommoda- are usually not revealed to the public (e.g., e.g. external genitals
tion of those individuals provides them with a pool of suitable revealed to or forced upon an unconsenting individual). Thus,
spouses that grants them a choice of whether to marry a man or for the purpose of sexual assault or bathroom designations,
a woman. Because this choice may not be limited to those indi- physical sex characteristics may be the most appropriate criteria
viduals on the basis of sex, it must also be granted to individuals on which to base different treatment.64
who identify themselves as men and women. Thus, marriage
The court in In re Heilig noted that many courts find, for
rights must be blind as to a person’s sex characteristics at birth purposes of marriage, that an individual’s biological sexual
as well as an individual’s gender identity, and should be defined constitution is fixed at birth and cannot be changed unless a
as between two individuals, not between a man and a woman, in mistake has been made at birth and later revealed by medical
order to comply with the equal protection mandates of the ERA.
investigation.65 As the facts make clear, and because the law in
Physical sex characteristics are not immutable, but gender this field should depend upon medical facts,66 when an
identity is. A focus on physical sex characteristics is therefore individual is born, that individual’s gender identity has been
more easily evaded than a focus on gender identity and cannot decided.67 Thus, while basing a classification system on an
be considered narrowly tailored. Once the focus has shifted to individual’s genitals at birth may often lead to the appropriate
the relevant characteristic, it becomes apparent that individuals classification, sometimes it will lead to a mistake, mis-

If the government is interested in defining sex
for the purpose of marriage on a basis other
than gender identity, it should do so by stating
precisely what sex characteristics it feels are
relevant to marriage.
whose identity does not fit within the binary sex categories do
not have marriage rights at all, and individuals who were born
with inconsistent sex characteristics are more burdened than
those who were not, solely because they are a minority sex class.
Requiring any showing of sex produces nonsensical results, and
reliance on physical sex characteristics is not narrowly tailored
either. Because the asserted interests inherently cannot be
furthered by narrowly tailored means, they are revealed as
70

identifying an individual as a male or female based on that
individual’s genitalia.68
Because they are “universally recognized as inherent, rather
than chosen,” attempts to change a person’s gender identity to
conform to physical sex characteristics have consistently
failed.69 In addition, although they are noticeable, physical sex
characteristics are reversible because they can be altered by way
of hormone treatment or sex reassignment surgery, but are likely
to be altered only to conform to gender identity, which is
immutable.70 Indeed, sexual reassignment surgery “merely
harmonizes a person’s physical characteristics with that
identity.”71 Therefore, a person whose sex characteristics fit the
binary categories and who feels that physical sex characteristics
are immutable is correct with respect to himself or herself
because it would counter the dictates of his or her gender

THE MODERN AMERICAN

identity to alter their already congruent sex characteristics.
However, this is not the case for transgendered individuals.
If the government is interested in defining sex for the
purpose of marriage on a basis other than gender identity, it
should do so by stating precisely what sex characteristics it feels
are relevant to marriage. It would not be unreasonable to expect
the legislature to do this. Indeed, Maryland reconstructed its
rape statute to define the crime based on the physical sex characteristics it found, to be most naturally vulnerable.72 However, if
sex can be said to be relevant to marriage, then the relevant
characteristic is gender identity, not physical sex characteristics.
To the extent that a person’s sex is defined by physical sex characteristics, for the purposes of marriage, the definition does not

fit under a “unique characteristics” exception.

CONCLUSION
Marriage may not be limited as between a man and a
woman, and there is no narrowly tailored definition of man and
woman that does not exclude a class of people based on sex.
Because requiring any showing of sex prior to marriage, or limiting marriage based on genitals at birth, is not narrowly tailored
to further a compelling government interest, defining marriage
as between a man and a woman violates the ERA. To comply
with the ERA, marriage should be defined as between two
individuals, rather than as between a man and a woman.
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